Professionalization of Peace Operations: Causes, Dynamics and Effects by Sending, Ole Jacob
Professionalization of Peace Operations
Causes, Dynamics and Effects
 
Ole Jacob Sending
N
orw
egian Institute of International A
ffairs
D
epartm
ent of Security and Conflict M
anagem
ent
Security in Practice 10 · 2010
[NUPI Report] 
Publisher: 
Copyright:
ISBN:
Visiting address:
Address:
Internet:
E-mail:
Fax:
Tel:
The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
© Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 2010
978-82-7002-290-8
Any views expressed in this publication are those of the 
author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the 
views of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. 
The text may not be printed in part or in full without the 
permission of the author.
C.J. Hambros plass 2 d
P.O. Box 8159 Dep. 
NO-0033 Oslo 
Norway
www.nupi.no
info@nupi.no
[+ 47] 22 36 21 82
[+ 47] 22 99 40 00
Ole Jacob Sending
With the assistance of Ingrid Marie Breidlid
Professionalization of Peace Operations 
Causes, Dynamics and Effects 
Abstract 
Peace operations have not only become “multi-dimensional”, but also highly profes-
sionalized. The report goes through what professionalization entails, identifies some 
of its effects, and discusses some of its implications for on-going debates about ways 
to make peace operations more effective. One central claim is that professionalization 
entails increased differentiation and specialization of tasks: the different dimensions 
of peace operations – protection of civilians, rule of law, democratization etc – are 
becoming ever more refined and specific and defined through best practices and guide-
lines. Professionalization may thus result in an increase in coordination challenges. 
Another claim is that the different tasks that make up post-conflict reconstruction are 
endogenous rather than exogenous to professional groups’ search for and nurturing 
of authority: professional actors have interests, and they advance these in part by 
seeking to define what is to be governed and for what purpose, which helps secure 
their authority over specific tasks. Thus, professionally shared conceptions of what is 
to be governed, how and why may be more important than organizational affiliation. 
The implication of this is that current debates about the need for more coordination 
and better integration of security, humanitarian and developmental concerns – as in 
the concept of Integrated Missions – may be off target. Integrating or coordinating 
between the tasks controlled and performed by professional actors will not be achieved 
by organizational reform but requires changes in and alliances between professional 
groups’ conceptions of governance. 
The present research was made possible through a grant from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign  
Affairs through the Training for Peace in Africa Progrmme (TfP).
Introduction 
As the UN has taken on ever more complex and ambitious tasks since 
the early 1990s, there have been a steady growth and institutionaliza-
tion of professional standards. The professionalization of the UN 
peace, development and humanitarian machinery has, however, gone 
largely unnoticed in the academic and policy literature. There has cer-
tainly been a lot of research and policy discussion about the need for 
better training, the development of best practices, and – more recently 
– for the establishment of a fully-fledged strategic framework for 
peace operations and auxiliary activities (i.e. DPKO’s Capstone Doc-
trine and New Horizons). There has also been considerable discussion 
of the need for better coordination and integration between the differ-
ent units that partake in post-conflict reconstruction – notably through 
the Delivering as One initiative and Integrated Missions. But there has 
not been much attention to what the process of professionalization im-
plies and how it may affect the nature of the work done by the actors 
involved. This report seeks to fill that gap. It looks at the profession-
alization process within the UN as it relates to the response to violent 
conflicts. The purpose of the study is to assess some central insights 
about the process and effects of professionalization from sociology 
and organizational studies, and to show how these insights can con-
tribute to better understandings of the dynamics of peace operations.  
 
The report is organized as follows: I first elaborate on why it is impor-
tant to understand and discuss post-conflict reconstruction without 
making heroic assumptions about the actors’ core interests and norma-
tive commitments. I then consider in some detail insights from organ-
izational theory and the sociology of professions about the process of 
professionalization and its effects on governance practices. One cen-
tral insight is that shared conceptions of what is to be governed, how 
and why is more important than organizational affiliation. Another is 
that how peace, relief and protection are defined is not at all exoge-
nous to professional groups’ search for and nurturing of authority: 
Professional actors have interests, and they advance these in part by 
seeking to define what is to be governed for what purpose, which 
helps secure their authority over specific tasks. I then illustrate how 
military professionals, humanitarian actors and civilian peace builders 
have markedly different conceptions of what is to be governed, how, 
and why. I conclude by reflecting on the implications of these findings 
for the currently popular idea that better coordination between distinct 
UN entities can increase effectiveness.  
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Do-gooders as professional actors 
In his introduction to the DPKO’s doctrine for peacekeeping – the 
Capstone Doctrine – then Under-Secretary-General Jean-Marie Gue-
henno emphasized that it formed part of a more long-term effort to 
professionalize peacekeeping. He noted that “In order to meet the 
challenges posed by the unprecedented scale and scope of today’s 
missions, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) have embarked 
on a major reform effort, Peace Operations 2010, aimed at strengthen-
ing and professionalizing the planning, management and conduct of 
United Nations peacekeeping operations” (2008: 3. Emphasis added). 
The ICRC similarly notes that the central motivation behind the de-
velopment of “Professional Standards for Protection Work” is that 
“the absence of common professional standards can … lead to situa-
tions in which protection work could actually cause harm to the very 
people and communities it seeks to protect. It is now generally agreed 
that an effective protection response demands adequate professional 
competence…” (ICRC 2009: 7. Emphasis added).  
 
That these two documents both stress the importance of professional-
ism in dealing, respectively, with peacekeeping, peace building and 
the protecting civilians is no coincidence. Nor is it a coincidence that 
they are produced at about the same time – in 2008 and 2009. Both 
documents stress not only that the development of professional stan-
dards and principles is important. They also both point out that given 
the variety of skills needed to perform these tasks and the professional 
background of those involved, a most central challenge is to manage 
and resolve conflicts and tensions that emanate from different profes-
sional backgrounds and competencies. The Capstone Doctrine says, 
for example, “Peacekeeping personnel will come from diverse na-
tional and professional backgrounds (including from significantly dif-
ferent civilian, military and police working cultures) which may cause 
friction…” (DPKO 2008: 65). And the ICRC makes a point of stress-
ing that whereas in the past, humanitarian and human rights actors 
were often at loggerheads in terms of their professional priorities and 
professed values, the single most important goal of the document is to 
establish a set of shared “baseline” professional standards that can 
align and bring humanitarian and human rights actors and organiza-
tions to work better together.  
 
Against this backdrop, there are good reasons to analyze peacekeeping 
and protection as performed by professional actors in the sense that 
they form a “group with common work”. (Abbott 1988: 20). In sug-
gesting that these actors are fruitfully understood as professionals, I 
am not arguing that they form well-bounded professions, such as the 
legal profession or the medical profession. But I do want to suggest 
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that the different actors involved in post-conflict work of different 
types form loosely bounded or proto-professions. They do so because 
they perform ‘common work’ on the basis of a set of either practical 
or academically generated conceptions of what is to be governed, 
how, and why. A key distinction between these professional groups 
and typical professions should be noted, however: with the exception 
of military professionals, those engaged in peace operations and hu-
manitarian relief form a professional group not necessarily by virtue 
of a shared educational background. In stead, it stems in no small part 
from practical work and experience, on the one hand, and from codi-
fied and abstract knowledge emanating from this experience and from 
associated research, on the other. 
 
A key implication of this perspective is that the contents of these con-
ceptions of governance are not given, but evolve over time through 
discussions, negotiations and trial and error where professional actors 
play a crucially important role. These conceptions are often defined in 
and through discussions at the field level and through processes aimed 
at distilling guidelines and best practices, and depending on how these 
are defined, some groups gain and others lose control over central 
tasks. Hence, a largely overlooked aspect of the process through 
which dominant conceptions of peacekeeping and protection work 
change is that of the discussion, competition and also conflicts be-
tween distinct professional groups themselves. Put more starkly, the 
contents of a given task – such as peacekeeping, protection, or devel-
opment – can be seen as temporary settlements of inter- or intra-
professional debate and competition. 
What is peacebuilding? What is protection? 
It is exceedingly hard to define “peace”, “security”, “protection” and 
“needs” according to external standards. In imposing a given defini-
tion of what constitutes peacebuilding, for example, we run the risk of 
imputing it with a meaning that it may not have in practice. Similarly, 
in studying humanitarian relief, we may start out by observing that 
these actors adhere to and defend the principles of neutrality and im-
partiality, but that does not tell us much about how these principles are 
interpreted and acted upon in practice. Nor does it tell us much about 
whether or not the meaning and operationalization of these principles 
are changing, both as a result of external factors – such as the target-
ing of humanitarian workers – and as a result of changing ideas about 
the meaning of humanitarianism by humanitarian workers themselves 
(cf. Barnett and Weiss 2008).  
 
How peacebuilding is constituted and delimited is thus not given by a 
set of abstract attributes against which peace builders’ norms, frames, 
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or organizational behaviour can be assessed. Similarly, while we can 
certainly get a sense of what “protection” is by looking at relevant in-
ternational legal documents, Security Council resolutions and mission-
specific strategies for protection, we risk overstating the importance of 
such documents for what practitioners actually do when they do pro-
tection work. Assuming in advance that the meaning and nature of 
protection and peacebuilding is given exogenously to the practices of 
governing in different settings often means projecting or reading into 
them a set of pre-conceived, often normatively laden, conceptions 
about what they should be. If one wants to assess the efficacy or ap-
propriateness of protection and of peacebuilding, it makes sense to 
establish an external yardstick. But it is not very helpful if we want to 
capture peacebuilding or protection as a set of interrelated social prac-
tices, the meaning of which inheres in how professional actors think of 
and actually do their work (Adler and Pouliot, n.d.).  
 
Despite the sophistication of some of the research on peacebuilding, 
there is an implicit assumption that there is some externally given 
standard for what peacebuilding really is or should be. This is what is 
implied in Barnett and Finnemore’s (2004) reference to the “patho-
logical” behaviour that they find in the UN’s Department of Peace-
keeping Operations (DPKO), in Paris’ (2003) argument that peace-
building is “constrained“ by specific world society norms, and in 
Autesserre’s (2009) account of the misleading “cognitive frames” that 
peace builders use in the Democratic Republic of Congo. For these 
authors, the central explanation of the functioning of peacebuilding is 
primarily located in factors that are external and contingent, not inter-
nal and constitutive. By shifting focus to the practices that the actors 
involved partake in, it is possible to identify the performative aspect of 
peacebuilding in terms, for example, of how peacebuilding emerges 
with its distinct meaning and significance in and through how peace 
builders categorize and understand the countries where they intervene 
in particular ways, how they judge different types of knowledge, and 
how they perceive of their own role.  
 
I should stress that policy documents and mandates from the UNSC 
evidently are important in grasping what protection, and peacebuild-
ing, is all about. Moreover, I do not mean to imply that turf battles and 
organizational rivalry are unimportant. Rather, I want to suggest that 
organizational rivalry and debates about the boundaries of humanitar-
ian space can be better understood when we see where these differ-
ences in view come from, and how they are advanced. And here, dis-
tinctly professional actors’ shared conceptions of what is to be gov-
erned, how and why are central. One important implication of this is 
that organizational integration or coordination will not lead to more 
effective approaches, as the fundamental differences that are played 
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out as organizational turf battles have to do with divergent concep-
tions of governance rooted in conceptions of governance. Hence, it is 
necessary to consider more seriously how shared conceptions of gov-
ernance can be established and institutionalized.  
 
To make headway in terms of integrating disparate elements of a 
peacebuilding strategy, therefore, it might be as important to consider 
how conceptions of governance emerge, change and can be institu-
tionalized across a wider set of professional actors, than to focus on 
the establishment of new organizational units or their integration into 
a new structure. A case in point is the new intelligence-gathering unit 
in UN integrated missions – the so-called Joint Missions Analysis Cell 
(JMAC). Shetler-Jones (2008) reports, for example, that these have 
not resulted in any significant integration between disparate elements 
of any integrated missions, in no small part because there are conflict-
ing interpretations and priorities by the actors involved – what I here 
call conceptions of governance. Shetler-Jones notes, for example, that 
development-oriented staff does not want to be subordinated to infor-
mation from the JMAC because it is perceived to privilege security 
concerns over developmental ones. The implication of this is that con-
ceptions of governance – the substance contents with which and from 
which actors define problems and seek to address them – appear more 
important than organizational positions.1 But what characterizes pro-
fessional actors’ work, and what do their operations imply for our un-
derstanding of peace operations and other post-conflict efforts? 
Authority, Expertise, Professionalization  
In an eloquent summary of the character of the professional, Thomas 
Brante recalls how he and a friend had to fix their car in Italy back in 
the late 1970s. The car all of a sudden did not go faster than 32 miles 
per hour. Having searched for and eventually found a garage, a man 
whom the other workers referred to as “Il Professore” entered the 
room:  
 
“an elderly gentleman dressed in a white doctor’s coat arrived. .. He 
ordered the young men to open the hood and start the engine. He be-
gan to walk slowly around the vehicle, hands behind his back, bowing 
his head and listening. After a few minutes he spoke a few quick 
words to one of the mechanics and left. Il Professore had given his di-
agnosis and a prescription. Il Professore listened to various symp-
toms. He focused on some of them. From the symptoms, he could 
draw on his knowledge of more general principles, in this case, the 
structure and operation of car engines, deducing (retroduction) what 
caused the unwanted symptoms. Judging from his attitude to his me-
                                                 
1  I owe this take on organizational affiliations and professional background – where the 
latter is seen as potentially more important than the former – to Leonard Seabrooke. 
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chanics, Il Professore regarded himself primarily as an ’organiza-
tional‘ professional” (Brante 2010: 2). 
 
At its core, the issue is how some actors rather than others are consti-
tuted as “experts”, thus being “an authority” and with a socially rec-
ognized claim to superior skills and knowledge to diagnose and treat 
specific tasks or problems. For Baumann, “The essence of expertise is 
that doing things properly requires certain knowledge, that such 
knowledge is distributed unevenly, that some persons possess more of 
it than others, that those that possess it ought to be in charge of doing 
things, …” (Baumann 2000: 196. Quoted in Barnett and Finnemore 
2004: 165). As I have argued elsewhere (Sending 2009), those that are 
engaged in peacebuilding typically account and justify their position 
as being “experts” on how to build peace in distant countries by refer-
ence precisely to “knowledge of more general principles”. There is, 
however, more at stake here than simply the reliance on general 
knowledge claims. It is also that Il Professore approached the task in a 
disinterested fashion and that he selected some rather than other symp-
toms (“he focused on some of them”) as central to diagnosing the 
problem. What is of interest here is that professionalization generally 
involves standardization (development of rules, operational proce-
dures), which implies that some symptoms and causes are highlighted 
and others marginalized. One implication of this is that professionali-
zation also involves the emergence of “blind spots” (Seabrooke, n.d.).  
 
Another implication is that efforts to produce and nurture a position of 
authority to govern with reference to superior knowledge and govern-
ance tools affect the organization and the content of governance ef-
forts. Stephen Hopgood’s (2006) analysis of Amnesty International is 
here exemplary. For Hopgood, Amnesty International is torn between 
two different and competing claims to authority – one moral, the other 
political – and this tension runs through the organization, shaping its 
identity and mode of operations where one camp is intent on shoring 
up moral authority by not interfering with and advocating explicit po-
litical reforms, while the other wants to use that shored up moral au-
thority to advocate for political change. Thus, a central concern here is 
how claims to authority put forth by professional actors shape the 
practice and meaning of peacebuilding and protection work.  
 
Both protection and peacebuilding are increasingly professionalized 
sets of practices where professionals – civilian, military, humanitarian 
– operate on the basis of a distinct knowledge base found in policy 
documents, operational guidelines and institutionalized “best prac-
tices”. This process of professionalization has, inter alia, resulted in 
the establishment of DPKO’s Best Practices Unit, and professional 
standards and codes of conduct for humanitarian agencies such as 
UNHCR and OCHA through the work of the Inter-Agency Standing 
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Committee (IASC) (Harvey et al. 2010).2 Similarly, the UNDP – also 
central to peacebuilding efforts through its role in more long-term re-
construction – has a virtual “Community of Practice” where staff dis-
cuss and learn from peers how to address particular challenges. This 
development is not surprising. The “rationalization” of large organiza-
tions is a ubiquitous feature of modern society, and international or-
ganizations are no exception (Barnett and Finnemore 2004).  
  
The concept of ligation (Abbott 2005) helps account for the social 
constitution of expertise by drawing attention to how the claims made 
by certain actors about the definition of a certain task (building peace, 
protection) are bound up with efforts to either establish or maintain a 
position of authority. This means, in turn, that the identity or meaning 
of the task over which professional actors claim control is endogenous 
to social interaction: peacebuilding, protection, humanitarian relief etc 
are defined by how professional actors define them, using a variety of 
strategies to claim authority and control over the definition of what is 
to be governed, who is to govern it, and how. The authority and func-
tioning of a professional group can in this light not be determined in-
dependently of the “task” it is defined in relation to (health for doc-
tors, law for lawyers, peace for peace builders). Rather, the “task” 
over which professionals claim authority and some level of jurisdic-
tional control, emerges with distinct properties, boundaries, and mean-
ing through the work of the professionals to construct it in a particular 
way (Abbott 2005: 249-250). The meaning and definition of “peace” 
and of “protection”, then, is produced in and through the way profes-
sional actors define and act on it as a specific task, and in so doing, 
their professional identity becomes linked to that task.  
 
Adopting the concept of ligation helps in spelling out how it is that the 
object to be governed – “post-conflict society” and the identity and 
practices of peace builders – is not at all an external and contingent 
relationship but an internal and constitutive one. Peace builders do, for 
example, define “the rule of law” as a set of principles derived from 
an a priori transcendental space rather than from a socio-political and 
historical one, the specifics of which it is for peace builders to identify 
and operationalize rather than for local actors to negotiate and agree 
upon through a political process (Sending 2009). Thus defined, the 
rule of law is a ”techne”, something that peacebuilders can fix by vir-
tue of their expertise in translating from the universal to the local: 
Their authority on how to build peace is secured through reference to 
universal standards, placing them in a position “above” politics.  
 
                                                 
2  Examples include the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in 
Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), and the Sphere Project. 
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By contrast, humanitarian organizations advance claims about a sepa-
rate “humanitarian space” within which individuals’ security and 
rights as civilians are to be protected against both military and politi-
cal considerations. Their authority as humanitarian professionals does 
not derive from a claim to expertise on how to engineer socio-political 
change. Rather, it derives from their definition of a space for action – 
“humanitarian space” – that is “outside” of politics. This is achieved 
by invoking the Geneva Convention and by insisting on the profes-
sionalism and effectiveness of humanitarian actors in relief delivery 
under difficult circumstances. Indeed, the two feed on each other, as 
claims about the need to preserve a space beyond politics are inti-
mately tied to the argument about the importance of upholding hu-
manitarian principles as a means to secure access. The reference point 
for humanitarian actors also differs significantly from that of person-
nel involved in peacebuilding: whereas the latter are focused on soci-
ety and its transformation, the former are primarily oriented towards 
individuals and collectives thereof who are in need of help (Barnett 
and Weiss 2008).  
 
Liisa Malkki (1996) has described how the continual construction of 
humanitarianism as outside of politics affects how humanitarian actors 
categorize, understand and interact with refugees. Humanitarian prac-
tices of organizing and producing knowledge of refugees work to si-
lence the refugees’ own histories, privileging instead “physical, non-
narrative evidence”, since the latter operate at the level of the moral 
and humanitarian, not historical and political. Reflecting on how hu-
manitarian actors administrating refugee camps interacted with refu-
gees, Malkki argues that  
 
“…history tended to get leached out of the figure of the refugee, as 
imagined by their administrators. This active process of dehistoriciza-
tion was inevitably also a project of depoliticization. For to speak 
about the past, about the historical trajectory that had led the Hutu as 
refugees into the western Tanzanian countryside, was to speak about 
politics. This could not be encouraged by the camp administrators; po-
litical activism and refugee status were mutually exclusive here, as in 
international refugee law more generally” (1996: 385). 
 
Adopting the concept of ligation helps in spelling out how it is that the 
object to be governed, here “refugees”, is bound up with humanitarian 
workers’ claim to a position of authority by virtue of standing outside 
of politics. The contrast with peace builders is striking: For humanitar-
ian workers, the individual is the object of reference, whereas for 
peace builders, it is society. For humanitarian workers, the key task is 
to alleviate suffering, whereas for peace builders, it is transforming 
society. Moreover, for humanitarian organizations, there is a set of 
legal rules and principles in place that they actively use to nurture 
their position as authorities on individual “needs” outside of the politi-
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cal sphere. For peace builders, no legal document of the same sort ex-
ists, and thus the claim to authority is grounded in a claim to expertise 
on the ends and means of peace. These differences in conceptions of 
governance are intimately tied up with and are constitutive of these 
actors’ professional identity: humanitarian actors’ professional iden-
tity differs from that of peace builders’ because they define and ap-
proach their object of governance in different ways (cf. Abbott 2005). 
Peacebuilding and Protection  
In the contemporary era, “emergency” and “disaster” are not apolitical 
labels on events or situations. Calling something an emergency, and 
succeeding in getting acceptance for that term, has huge political and 
economic implications. As Craig Calhoun has noted, the term emer-
gency calls for immediate action, not for analysis. And those that are 
affected by these emergencies – whether caused by natural disaster, 
man-made drought, or war – assume status as suffering individuals 
rather than citizens with rights whose political identities, histories and 
aspirations matter (Calhoun 2010). How an “emergency” is defined 
and responded to, is not something that we can readily understand 
without analyzing in some detail the interests, resources and behaviour 
of the professional groups involved.  
 
Humanitarian work was historically more circumscribed than it is to-
day. Being actors with considerable resources operating in situations 
where ordinary structures typically don’t work, they were always po-
litical in one sense. But following the humanitarian debates from the 
early 1990s and also somewhat before that, a new set of tasks and ob-
jectives was included in what was considered typical and appropriate 
humanitarian work. While writing specifically about famine, de 
Waal’s description of how the justification for the expansion of tasks 
into new areas testifies to the importance of understanding how 
changes in conceptions of governance are part and parcel of profes-
sional groups’ search for authority and control, and how they affect 
how governance is practised. De Waal notes that one effect of the ex-
tension of humanitarian work into more explicitly political areas (cf. 
Barnett and Weiss 2008), was that the  
 
“language of basic rights and humanitarian principles obscured the to-
tal lack of any engagement with the local political process that can ac-
tually resolve the problems of famine. It was becoming harder, not 
easier, for the humanitarian international to recognize and support 
anti-famine political contrasts” (de Waal 1997: 157). 
 
After the bombings of the UN compound in Iraq in August 2003, rep-
resentatives of the UN grieved the loss of their colleagues, indirectly 
criticized the US for intervening in the first place, and pointed out that 
Ole Jacob Sending 14 
the UN was there to help Iraqis, not support the US-led coalition. 
Then Under-Secretary-General Mark Malloch-Brown told reporters 
that "We do this out of vocation. We are apolitical. We were there to 
help the people of Iraq and help them return to self-government". He 
added, "This is another blow at the neutrality and the impartiality of 
the UN flag.” At the same time, there is no shortage of analyses that 
paint a picture of an increasingly professionalized and politicized field 
of humanitarian relief, including work on protection. One report 
states, for example, that  
 
“humanitarian programming is becoming increasingly intertwined 
with human rights activities. Rule of law and access to justice pro-
grammes are common features in humanitarian response, and human 
rights and humanitarian agencies increasingly share information and 
coordinate responses. As one interviewee stated: ‘protection was 
seized upon in order to be able to talk about human rights’. Child pro-
tection, sexual and gender-based violence and returnee monitoring ac-
tivities are programmatic and pragmatic responses by humanitarian 
agencies to violations of the rights of civilians. Agencies increasingly 
construe their role as advocates on behalf of the victims of crises, and 
even agents for change, particularly in the context of complex politi-
cal emergencies” (Callaghan and Pantuliano 2007: 8). 
 
If “protection was seized upon in order to be able to talk about human 
rights” from within humanitarian circles, it is interesting to note that 
the reverse was the case when the international human rights move-
ment started in earnest after WWII. As Garth and Dezalay (2002) have 
noted, proponents of human rights inserted themselves into discus-
sions about humanitarian law, thus linking an internationally sensitive 
political issue to a more heavily institutionalized and less politically 
sensitive one. At the time, there was a convention on humanitarian 
issues (Geneva Convention) and (merely) a political declaration on 
human rights (Declaration of Human Rights). The more general point 
to be made here does not so much concern the degree to which peace-
building is considered political while humanitarianism less so. 
Clearly, both concern politics, but in slightly different ways, owing to 
how the task in question is conceptualized and how these tasks are jus-
tified.  Rather, the point is that how professionals in peacebuilding and 
in humanitarian relief define and approach their respective tasks af-
fects their view of what is and what is not political, and consequently 
what they do and how they do it.  
 
I recognize that the categories used here do not correspond neatly to 
the current evolution of protection strategies in the field, and there is 
certainly overlap in professional competence and areas of work. None-
theless, we can identify distinct ways of defining the core problems of 
how to operate and what to aim for in conflict and post-conflict envi-
ronments: differences in professional ways of doing things do matter 
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both for debates about strategies and organizational structures for 
post-conflict reconstruction, and for considerations of how to train and 
equip future civilian and military personnel of UN peace operations.  
 
A clearly stated dimension of the stakes involved here are found in 
Hugo Slim’s (2003) observation that humanitarian actors define hu-
manitarianism in ways that seem to imply that only some actors – 
proper, professional humanitarian actors – can operate and define 
what is “humanitarian”. Slim observes that the humanitarian tradition 
has a “strong conviction that an ethic of restraint, kindness and repair 
in war is universal, a trans-cultural phenomenon that is found in all 
peoples”, and proceeds to ask (rhetorically), ”Doesn’t this mean that 
everyone should be a humanitarian?” Judged against humanitarian ac-
tors’ positions on who is allowed to perform humanitarian work, the 
answer is no. Slim concludes that  
 
“The main issue seems to be a feeling that humanitarian NGOs want 
to put moral boundaries around what can rightfully be considered 
humanitarian action.  In doing so, they seem to be suggesting that 
such boundaries to humanitarian action are not about activities (what 
is being done: food, water, shelter etc) but agents and motives (who is 
doing these activities and for what reason)” (Slim 2003). 
 
Against this backdrop, it is instructive to look at the current debate 
about the balancing of two objectives that are set up as being distinct 
and potentially at loggerheads, namely peacebuilding and protection 
of civilians. In a discussion of the protection mandate of MONUC in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, one report stresses that “MONUC 
has been mandated to support the weak and often criminal Congolese 
military, the FARDC, while simultaneously protecting civilians from 
ongoing violence. MONUC mission leadership and the UN Security 
Council must reinforce the mission’s protection strategies, and ensure 
…that support given to the FARDC does not undermine overarching 
protection objectives”. (Refugees International 2009). Similarly, 
DPKO has concluded that “In UNMIS, … reallocating the mission’s 
finite resources from efforts to support the CPA (Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement) to activities that prioritize PoC has been extremely 
challenging given the critical importance of both areas” (DPKO 2010: 
3). Note that in both circumstances, a tension is identified between 
peacebuilding objectives – supporting the Congolese state and the im-
plementation of the CPA – and protection objectives.  
 
How humanitarian organizations’ authority is constituted and nur-
tured, and how it differs from that of peace builders, is quite clearly 
brought out in the current debate within the UN on the issue of Protec-
tion of Civilians (PoC). For humanitarian organizations, PoC is a task 
that is grounded in key provisions of the Geneva Conventions and 
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subsequent protocols. It also has to do with the broader concept of 
“vulnerability” and covers a range of activities or tasks that can help 
protect groups against risks of different sorts, be it famine, earth-
quakes, or war. For DPKO, by contrast, PoC is at its core about 
“physical protection” that can be provided by the tools at the disposal 
of the DPKO, and is primarily defined in terms of “imminent threat” 
of attacks from rebel groups. For peace builders, and for DPKO, PoC 
is a strategic challenge inasmuch as being mandated to do protection 
may conflict with other key tasks, such as peace - or state building. 
Allan Doss, SRSG for MONUC, recently reflected on the tensions in-
volved in doing both PoC and peacebuilding:  
 
“How do you protect people, but at the same time, disarm and dis-
mantle foreign and local armed groups?  How do you do it in a place 
such as the Kivus, help end a crisis, but at the same time, do it in a 
way that protects people?  You know, ending the crisis is essentially a 
political task, protecting civilians in some ways a humanitarian task. 
… So these are complex issues, and sometimes, as I say, there are 
contradictory elements in our mandate, which puts a huge pressure on 
a mission, and frankly is leading us sometimes into rather uncharted 
waters” (Doss 2009). 
 
The “tension” that MONUC faces in both doing protection of civilians 
(“a humanitarian task”) and at the same time doing peacebuilding (“a 
political task”)  stems, I submit, from the continual reproduction, by 
the actors themselves, of a particular relationship with their object of 
reference as either being outside the political (humanitarian) or as 
above the political (peacebuilding). For humanitarian actors, this 
means reading out the historical and socio-political causes of humani-
tarian crises. For peace builders it often means subordinating knowl-
edge of local context to universal standards, and privileging interna-
tional over local sources of legitimacy.  
 
In the new model for protection of civilians published by the DPKO 
and also the standards identified by the ICRC, there is explicit refer-
ence to the importance of both physical protection and the building of 
a political framework that can prevent attacks against civilians and 
also the more general threat of violation of core rights. Thus, even on 
account of the main actors’ own policies and standards, building peace 
is a means to protect civilians, and protection is conversely seen as a 
means to strengthen peacebuilding efforts. What, then, is all the fuzz 
about? I argue that the debate over these issues between humanitarians 
and peace builders (both military and civilian) has to do, as Slim al-
ludes to in the quote above, with who is doing it and who is in a posi-
tion to decide which objective is to take precedence over the other: it 
displays the different professional actors’ views on what to do, how, 
and by whom.  
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This market-like competition for turf or jurisdiction is clearly brought 
out in Barnett and Ramalingam’s discussion of the “humanitarian’s 
dilemma”. While recognizing the volume of the humanitarian sys-
tem’s efforts to improve over the last decade or so, they point out that 
 
“Agencies want to help others while advancing their organisational 
interests, and are likely to pursue actions that they believe will reso-
nate with those interests. This is not surprising, as one of the basic 
lessons from business strategy is to identify and exploit niches. From 
this perspective, the objectives of aid agencies can be paraphrased as: 
to assist targeted beneficiaries in such a way that our good works are 
seen and valued by donor communities and the profile of our agency 
is enhanced, so we can do more good works in the future, working in 
a collaborative fashion where possible” (2010: 4). 
 
The sum-total of this competitive logic is that those reforms that have 
been supported and implemented by aid agencies are those that “en-
hance their autonomy and size – more humanitarian space, more re-
sources, and more flexibility and control over how they spend their 
money” (ibid: 5). The authors hasten to add that aid agencies are of 
course concerned with the beneficiaries of aid. The issue is how the 
rules and incentives of the humanitarian system are structured in a 
way that each agency’s primary interest may come into conflict with 
the effectiveness of the system as a whole (i.e. coordination issues). 
This is not, I submit, a peculiarity of humanitarian organizations. It 
also holds for development agencies and those involved in peace op-
erations.  
 
Consider, moreover, the on-going debates between humanitarians and 
military professionals about the nature and limits of humanitarian 
space, the division of tasks between them in complex emergencies, 
and also the debate between them regarding what is to be prioritized 
when and decided by whom on what grounds. Military professionals 
define their professional identity in relation to objectives traditionally 
concerned with control and defence of a territory, and to “clear, hold, 
build”. Certainly, the development of so-called counter-insurgency 
doctrines aims to render military techniques more effective in also re-
building and de facto acting on individuals to address the causes of 
conflict as a tool to marginalize insurgents and to shore up support 
from civilians. Nonetheless, traditional military practice is still distinct 
from that of humanitarian actors operating in the same physical loca-
tion. When these two groups are to cooperate to formulate strategies 
and best practices, and to make decisions on what to prioritize, con-
flicts and tensions are bound to emerge. What type of conception of 
governance emerges as dominant through such a process will affect 
the scope, nature and status of each of the professional actors in-
volved.  
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These dynamics will always be more pronounced and significant dur-
ing periods where the nature of the task to be performed is uncertain 
and where there is no settled or dominant conception of how to gov-
ern. For example, military and political strategies for security and 
post-conflict reconstruction have come to include humanitarian relief 
as a means to enhance effectiveness to attain non-humanitarian objec-
tives, most infamously captured in then-Secretary of State Colin Pow-
ell’s reference to humanitarian organizations in Afghanistan as “force 
multipliers”. Whether true or not, this is how humanitarian profes-
sionals see it. A case in point is how the humanitarian bulletin Hu-
manitarian Aid on the Move recently described the state of affairs:  
 
“NATO and the European Union are increasingly trying to integrate 
humanitarian aid into their strategic agendas. UN integrated missions 
are going in the same direction. Humanitarian aid is being “bunker-
ised”, militarised and politicised and is becoming a crisis management 
tool. As such, it runs the risk of losing the characteristics which allow 
victims to gain access to aid and protection” (URD 2010).  
 
At the same time, the scope of humanitarian action has expanded con-
siderably since at least the 1990s, now including human rights as a 
core concern, and also moving in the direction of addressing the 
causes of conflicts (Barnett 2005). This is acknowledged by humani-
tarian organizations themselves as they describe the expansion of 
tasks and also the broader range of situations where they perform their 
work (ICRC 2009). Running parallel to these developments, however, 
has been an increase in “expertise and specialization” and an attendant 
investment in governance efforts in new areas such as “child protec-
tion, sexual and gender-based violence and access to justice” (ibid). 
Against this background, it seems important to treat those involved in 
peace operations and protection work as professional actors that have 
interests, the advancement of which affects the contents of how 
peacebuilding and protection are defined and implemented.  
 
The upshot of all this is that the debates about improved coordination 
and so-called Integrated Missions may be off target (cf. Paris 2009).  
While integrated missions may increase effectiveness in advancing 
given objectives, it does presume that one already knows what works 
best. Much research on peace operations suggests that this is not the 
case (Englebert and Tüll 2008). More importantly, the premise for the 
debate about and efforts to reform the UN’s operational effectiveness 
in peace operations is that organizational structures matter more than 
the professional identity and outlook of the actors involved. In short, 
the debate about coordination and integration assumes that where you 
stand depend on where you sit in organizational terms, whereas the 
perspective advanced here suggests that who you are as a professional 
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actor determines what you think from, which often overrides organiza-
tional positions and boundaries.  
 
In this light, the future effectiveness and success of peace operations 
and protection work do not ride on organizational reforms alone, nor 
on the development of best practices and the training of professionals 
that are to do the tasks involved, but also – and crucially so – on 
whether convergence on conceptions of governance can be facilitated 
between different types of professional actors.  
 
In the context of the increase in the number of peace operations with a 
specific mandate to protect civilians, DPKO and OHCA recently 
commissioned a study to take stock of what is being done in peace 
operations to protect civilians and to identify ways to improve current 
practice. The report “Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peace-
keeping Operations”, Holt and Taylor (2009), provides a comprehen-
sive account of the state of affairs of protection work in UN peace op-
erations. In their foreword, the USGs of DPKO and OCHA, Alain le 
Roi and John Holmes, note that despite the “positive developments” 
that can be identified in terms of making protection of civilians more 
central to the UN’s work in conflict zones, these have “not translated 
into systematic and consistent protection of civilians on the ground” 
(2009: iv).  
 
The report concludes that the “presumed ‘chain’ of events to support 
protection of civilians –from the earliest planning, to Security Council 
mandates to the implementation of mandates by peacekeeping mis-
sions in the field – is broken” (Holt and Taylor 2009: 5). It lists a 
number of factors that helps explain why. Key among these are that 
planning that informs UNSC discussions, and thus also mandates, 
does not adequately assess the threats to civilians; that the Secretariat 
(i.e. DPKO) does not have a good grasp of the UNSC’s intent as re-
gards protection; that the confusion of the UNSC’s intent results in 
inadequate guidance and planning by the Secretariat; and that the sum-
total of all of this are gaps in planning, guidance and preparation for 
protection work (ibid: pp. 6-8). It specifies that there is considerable 
confusion about what protection work entails, with the UNSC some 
times referring to a very broad concept of protection consistent with 
human rights and humanitarian law, some times defining it as an end-
result of what peace operations already do, and others still as physical 
protection against imminent threats. This differentiation process, with 
peace operations being specified into ever more specific tasks and ob-
jectives, is also reflected in the increased scope and level of detail in 
UNSC mandates: these have come to include increasingly detailed 
language about tasks and specific objectives to be carried out. While 
this growth in the specificity of mandates can be traced to a number of 
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factors, this development feeds into the logic of professionalization 
since it entails the differentiation and specification of tasks for which 
best practices are being development.  
 
Confusion on the part of different actors about what protection is or 
should be, and about how it is to be achieved, stems, I submit, not 
from inadequate knowledge, lack of clarity, or from the inherent com-
plexity of the task of protection. Holt and Taylor identify through their 
interviews three different interpretations of the protection of civilians. 
One set of actors define protection in terms of international humanitar-
ian law and human rights and thus as an overarching objective for all 
post-conflict work. That is: protection is the ultimate objective and 
peace operations and development work more generally are or should 
all be geared towards this ultimate end. Another set of actors treat pro-
tection as a new task that is to be carried out alongside the overarching 
objective of building peace. A third set of actors see protection in 
terms not dissimilar to the first group, but conceive of it not in terms 
of human rights and international humanitarian law, but as synony-
mous with the goal of producing peace. Hence, protection of civilians 
is here seen to be redundant as a separate task.  
 
Crucially, Holt and Taylor do not link these different interpretations to 
specific organizational units, as they are to be found across a wider 
spectrum of actors operating within different parts of the UN. Cer-
tainly, there tends to be a dominant conception of governance within 
an organization, but as Hopgood (2006) has shown in the case of Am-
nesty International, there are often competing conceptions of govern-
ance within the same organization. Thus, focusing on coordination 
and integration between organizational units may often be off target, 
and fleshing out the contents, scope and implications of professional 
conceptions of governance seems important for debates about the ef-
fectiveness of peace operations. 
Conclusion 
Experts and professional groups mark global governance at every turn. 
Or as one observer has argued: “professions have never been more 
important to the well-being of society. …How [such] professional ex-
pertise is developed, how it is deployed, by whom it is deployed and 
for what ends are among the most pressing issues facing all modern 
nations” (2000: 673). This includes, as I have tried to show above, 
humanitarian relief, peace operations, protection work, and broader 
peacebuilding efforts. While extant literature on peace operations is 
clearly cognizant of the efforts to professionalize peace operations 
through the institutionalization of best practices and the development 
of training and operational guidelines for ever more specific tasks, 
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there is little discussion about what this entails for the dynamics of 
peace operations as a form of governing. Focusing here on peace op-
erations,  on protection, and on the broader question of the relation-
ship between humanitarian, civilian, and military professional actors, I 
have tried to show that conceptions of governance matter more than 
organizational structures, and that efforts to integrate and coordinate 
different aspects of the UN’s work in conflict zones may be off target. 
The tendency to try to “mainstream” new tasks and objectives across 
different UN entities is a clear example of the limitations of thinking 
in organizational, rather than professional, terms. That is: moving 
from a system where one office in charge of a particular set of tasks 
and a particular objective – be it gender, or protection of civilians – to 
one where all organizational units are supposed to take it on board has 
yet to result in increased effectiveness. The reason why this is so is 
that the actors involved – being professional actors – will take on 
board and prioritize new tasks and objectives as part of a push for 
mainstreaming if and only if the new task can be made integral to and 
supportive of their already established core conceptions of govern-
ance. Thus, identifying what these conceptions of governance are, 
whether they converge or conflict with that of other professional ac-
tors, and specifying how they can be changed and institutionalized 
seems an important route to explore.  
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